As diplomatic efforts intensify to end the devastating war in Gaza, experts warn that the political dynamics surrounding the proposed U.S. plan, reportedly involving disarming Hamas and restructuring post-war governance, could reshape the regional balance in unpredictable ways.
On Thursday, Israel and Hamas agreed to the first phase of a ceasefire based on a plan put forward by US President Donald Trump, in a deal met with scepticism, fear, yet also some joy and relief in Gaza.
The ‘peace plan’ promises a temporary pause, a timetable for the release of captives, and the start of humanitarian access. Yet beneath the diplomatic fanfare lies a web of unresolved questions about enforcement, disarmament, reconstruction, and accountability.
When President Trump addressed his cabinet on Thursday, he framed the agreement as a personal and political victory.
“We are getting the hostages back on Tuesday, Monday or Tuesday, and that’ll be a day of joy,” he said, adding that the deal could open the way to “lasting peace”.
Israel’s government swiftly ratified the outline: “The government has just now approved the framework for the release of all of the hostages – the living and the deceased,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office said following the cabinet vote.
Yet the terms agreed upon in this first phase – a cessation of hostilities, a partial withdrawal to “agreed lines”, and the staged release of captives and Palestinian prisoners and detainees – are only the opening chapter of a 20-point framework that raises as many doubts as it answers.
Among the most combustible items is the demand for the disarmament of Hamas. The White House plan explicitly places demilitarisation on the horizon, yet how this will be achieved, by whom, and under what legal mandate remains unclear.
Scepticism and warnings
On the morning of 10 October, and despite a declared ceasefire, Israeli forces continued shelling in the north of Khan Younis in southern Gaza, according to Al Jazeera.
Mohammed Hamas Elmasry, a media professor at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, expressed scepticism over the ceasefire’s immediate impact.
“The fact that Israel is continuing to attack should not be seen as a surprise. Israel almost always uses the time leading up to a ceasefire deal’s implementation to bomb, even when there is no real military purpose,” he told Doha News.
Elmasry further emphasised the strategic motives behind these violations: “Given that one Israeli goal is to destroy Gaza and make it uninhabitable, I think they’ll continue to attack until they are forced to stop.”
Elmasry criticised the broader peace plan, describing it as “awful for Palestinians”, highlighting its failure to address the ongoing occupation and blockade of Gaza.
“It doesn’t address Israel’s illegal blockade of Gaza or its illegal occupation of the West Bank, nor does it provide a promise of a Palestinian state,” he said.
He also warned of potential internal opposition within Israel: “Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition will look for any opportunity to sabotage the deal, end the fragile peace, and fulfil their promise of ‘Greater Israel’.”
Imed Ben Labidi, an associate professor in the Media Studies programme, expressed similar doubts.
“We are looking at a time where these are unpredictable circumstances that we are watching. If Hamas gives up all they have, and I am not predicting anything, as it’s hard for now, with these characters, Trump and Netanyahu, the captives are the key,” he told Doha News.
“Netanyahu has proved to the world, and to the Israelis more than once, that they truly don’t matter to him. He kept bombing and bombing and bombing, including when Hamas told them, ‘You are killing the hostages.’ He didn’t stop,” he added.
Ben Labidi believes that even if the first phase is achieved, it would be seen merely as a political credit to Trump.
“Trump, who wants credit for a ceasefire regardless, even if they stop bombing for a week, it will still be credited to him. Trump is like a kid; give him a bit of candy and he’s happy. It doesn’t matter if it doesn’t solve the problem,” he explained.
“It’s just going to be incredibly risky, and I know that Hamas is under pressure from negotiators from Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt to make the deal. But to make the deal based on the goodwill of Trump and Netanyahu? I would not trust either one of them,” he said.
Enforcement, verification and the risk of backsliding
Previous ceasefires in this war have repeatedly frayed, with UN bodies and Palestinian authorities documenting numerous alleged violations by Israeli occupation forces.
The UN has repeatedly warned of systematic breaches and, in a separate investigation earlier this year, UN investigators concluded that Israeli aggression in Gaza met the threshold of crimes under international law and has been described as genocide.
Professor Elmasry warned that compliance depends not on paperwork but on political will.
“Trump is the key to all of this holding. If he is serious, then he will force Netanyahu to adhere to the agreement in full. If he only wants the release of Israeli hostages, or only wants a line to add to his case for a Nobel Peace Prize, then the agreement will end at phase one,” he said.
Disarmament: Technical problem, political trap
The plan’s second phase envisages the disarmament of Hamas, a daunting and controversial task.
Elmasry suggested a likely compromise
“I think Hamas will insist that they be allowed to keep some weapons, particularly those that can do no harm to Israel, so long as there are no Israeli soldiers inside Gaza. If Hamas still has heavier weapons, it will likely insist that they be transferred to a Palestinian governing body,” he said.
“I think the tunnels are the bigger issue, though. The Trump plan calls for destroying all tunnels. This would be a real problem for the Palestinians, particularly if Israel’s blockade of Gaza is not addressed. The suffocating blockade has made the tunnels an economic necessity. According to the United Nations, the overwhelming majority of some goods – including food and livestock – have long entered Gaza through the tunnels,” he added.
Elmasry argued that “disarmament” in this context could mean stripping Palestinians of armed capacity while leaving Israeli control over borders, airspace and maritime routes intact, a pattern that would further erode Palestinian sovereignty even if it reduces the immediate risk of violence.
Reconstruction, trauma and the question of justice
The human cost remains immeasurable. UN agencies warn of an acute humanitarian emergency marked by food shortages, a devastated health system, and psychological trauma among both children and adults.
The UN has prepared emergency relief to reach millions in the enclave, but has stressed that reconstruction will be slow and difficult. Officials estimate that clearing the rubble alone could take more than two decades.
Elmasry was blunt on accountability: “Israel has ensured that hundreds of thousands of Gazans will, for the rest of their lives, be susceptible to serious physical and mental illnesses,” he said.
“I am confident that Israel will be found guilty of genocide, but I am not optimistic that Netanyahu will face meaningful accountability during his lifetime.”
Ben Labidi also noted that Netanyahu could face legal consequences if the war ends.
“If Hamas gives up all the captives, they literally have no chip to bargain with. If the war stopped, Netanyahu would face legal actions. What would prevent Netanyahu from wiping out Gaza and then going back to Trump and apologising, saying, ‘I couldn’t stop the planes; they were already in the air?’,” he said.
For now, Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey, with the United States at the centre, are named as guarantors of the process. Both Doha and Cairo hold leverage through border control, financial support, and diplomatic channels.
However, their power remains largely persuasive, contingent upon a stronger and sustained commitment from Washington.
Both Elmasry and Ben Labidi stressed that Trump’s influence and pressure on Netanyahu may be the only guarantee to keep the first phase alive for now.
